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The idea that digitalization in general and digital visuality in particular can have, alone, 
subversive or otherwise emancipative effects on politics is based on the belief the ideo-
logical apparatus supporting hegemonic relations consists of false ideas that the “power 
of images” can effectively challenge once larger part of society are given access to this 
“power”. This idea misinterprets the role of digital visuality by misconstruing the role of 
ideology and by positioning visual communication and associated technology in a sort 
of socio-political vacuum: beyond the reach of ideology and the relations of power sup-
ported by it. Based on the insights provided by the classical works of Walter Benjamin 
and Jean Baudrillard on the visual construction of reality, I argue that an authoritative 
discussion of the cultural, social and political implications of digital visuality in West-
ern societies invites the intellectual positioning of this process within the broader 
framework of hegemonic capitalism and the problems of control associated to it. My 
main point is that in Western societies, the actualization of the subversive potential of 
digital visuality, as well as that of other forms of communication, requires material con-
ditions that depend on ideology rather than technology. These ideological conditions 
explain why, for example, digital visuality may be effective in the cultural and socio-
political subversion of non-capitalist societies. In Western societies, however, and de-
spite the extensive subcultural uses of digital visuality, its subversive potential is fatally 
reduced (if not nullified) by mechanisms that can be subsumed in what Frederic Jame-
son called “the cultural logic of late capitalism”. In support of my main argument I offer 
some preliminary reflections on the media coverage of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and 
the uses of organized violence in the “Arab Spring” of 2011. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
This paper is part of a larger study on the power of visual communication. Here I would 
like to address the issue of digital visuality, a specific but nowadays seemingly domi-
nant form of visual communication, and the nature or direction of the power allegedly 
associated to it. The question then is: what is the “power” of digital visuality and what 
are its effects on politics (the competition for the control over the distribution on power 
in society)? I believe this question is core in any attempt to assess the socio-cultural im-
plications of innovation and technological development in communication.  
 
In order to locate my discussion within broader conceptual coordinates, I should men-
tion that my approach rejects technological determinism and what, in lack of a better 
term, I would describe as the contemplative tradition in visual analysis.  
 
Perspectives inspired by technological determinism usually consider communication or 
media technology as the source of change or the cause of social phenomena that catch 
the attention of the analysts. The problem with these perspectives is that by explaining 
social change with technological development they induce the naïve student to believe 
that technological development itself is not part of the social world. Far from being a 
neutral force, technological development is a core process that contains and reflects ide-
ological assumptions concerning the distribution of power in society. In my view, tech-
nological development and social change are interconnected and the evolution of both if 
fueled by politics: the competition for the control over the distribution of values in soci-
ety.  
 
The contemplative tradition to visual communication constructs the power of visual 
communication in terms of a relationship between the image and the viewer to study 
how and why this relationship changes in society. In the formulation of W. J. T. Mitch-
ell, “double consciousness” is a key concept in this approach. It expresses the idea that, 
although very few of us would believe that images are living things, still many more of 
us relate to images as if they were indeed alive (Mitchell, 2005, p. 11). From the “philo-
sophical argument” that “images are like living organisms”, this approach sets to ask: 
If the living image has always been the subject of a double consciousness, of simulta-
neous belief and disavowal, what conditions are making the disavowal more difficult to 
maintain today? Why, in other words, do various forms of “iconoclash” – the war of 
images – seem so conspicuously a part of the pictorial turn in our time? (Mitchell, 
2005, p. 11)  
This approach points to an important question (why are images seemingly more im-
portant today than in the past?) but, as I argued elsewhere, it does so in the wrong way. 
By adopting the metaphor of “live images” and inciting the viewer to pay attention to 
“what do pictures wants?” it falls prey of a fundamental attribution error: it looks for 
causes, reasons, motives etc. in the tools rather than in their users, in the objects rather 
than in the agent, in things rather than in humans. As technological determinism, but in 
a more sophisticated way, this approach seems unsuitable for the analysis of relations of 
power because in the “visual construction of the social” (Mitchell, 2005, p. 356) human 
agency remains hidden and the ideological origins of social change ultimately out of 
intellectual reach.   
 
3 
 
In my approach, the emancipative potential of visual forms of expression does not re-
side in technology nor in photography and therefore not in digital visuality. Rather it 
depends on the material and immaterial conditions that assist, support or hinder the ef-
fective usage of visual communication by human agents in the competition for the con-
trol over the distribution of values in society.  
 
First, I will discuss the limits of three main arguments that can be made in support of the 
emancipative potential of digital visuality. Second, with the help of a few insights from 
the works of Walter Benjamin and Jean Baudrillard, among others, I will give a closer 
look to the role of ideology and ideological apparatus in resolving the indeterminacy of 
visual communication. Finally, I will describe this role at work in the coverage of the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and of the “Arab Spring” in 2011. 
 
2. THE EMANCIPATIVE ARGUMENT  
The belief that digital visuality may indeed have important emancipative potentialities 
can presumably be based on at least three types of arguments concerning political dis-
sent, information and the formation of visual communities.  
2.1. Supporting voices of dissent and the circulation of “visual evi-
dence”  
A generic but widespread argument in support of digital visuality is the belief that this 
form of communication distinctively supports, incites, facilitates or otherwise helps the 
expression of societal “voices” of individuals and groups which are marginalized by 
mainstream media. A more specific argument along these lines is that digital visuality 
facilitates the production and circulation of visual evidence concerning abuses commit-
ted by oppressive regimes that can exert and effective control on institutional media. In 
this idea, the power of visual communication is based on something I would like to call 
“reality principle” and digital visuality, in other words, creates the conditions for simul-
taneity and ubiquity: we can know what’s happening everywhere in the world at the 
same time while it is happening. I am sure that few of us would disagree that it would 
be nice if oppressive regimes could be subverted by the mere circulation of visual evi-
dence of their dark deeds. The widespread possibility of showing and watching abuses 
committed every minute in every corner of the world does not translate automatically or 
necessarily into the possibility to do something about it. The political mobilization 
against systematic abusive behavior requires not only knowledge about these abuses and 
will to oppose them, but also political resources (e.g. force) and a political organization 
able to make effective use of them. More commonly, this type of visual evidence is used 
by other regimes, including democracy, to mobilize consensus against the perpetrator. 
In this respect, rather than promoting awareness and dissidence, digital visuality simply 
facilitates the usage of visual communication for political propaganda. It efficacy does 
not reflect the “power of images” or their relation to truth but the political strength of 
the political organization using it. More precisely, while the efficacy of visual commu-
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nication depends on its effective usage by a political organization, the emancipative po-
tential of this form of communication depends on the goals or interests of the same po-
litical organizations. From this perspective, it would seem that (digital) visual commu-
nication seems able to perform equally well to subvert oppressive as well as democratic 
regimes, to tell or to hide the truth, to support or to manipulate political “voice”. For 
good or bad, visual evidence became politically relevant if and when effectively used by 
an influential political organization. We’ll see in a moment this perspective may indeed 
provide some useful insights if applied to the visual coverage of the so called “Arab 
Spring”.  
 
If emancipation is discussed as a political process or phenomenon (and not e.g. a psy-
chological one) digital visuality appears to be neither a sufficient nor a necessary condi-
tion. The belief in its emancipative power seems rather to reflect a rather naïve idea of 
what politics is all about and a dramatic underestimation of political pragmatics: the 
complex interplay of material and immaterial conditions affecting the capacity of indi-
viduals and groups to participate to the competition for the control over the distribution 
of values in society. At its best, and discounting political propaganda, digital visuality 
can be a form of political communication that, as communication in general, is indeed a 
fundamental dimension of democratic participation.  
 
Finally, I would also like to add that the mobilizing effect of images of abuses should 
not be given for granted. Like all images, also these have ambivalent meanings and, 
therefore, roles. Images of victims of car accident, for example, may be used to invite 
caution in driving. They also feature prominently in websites that offer those for the 
visual pleasure of a morbid audience. The same happened with the images of Abu 
Ghraib.  
2.2. Creating the “imagined” community as a political actor  
A more interesting belief concerning the emancipative potential of digital visuality re-
flects the idea that images are a form of text with a distinctive emotional capacity. In the 
right conditions, images can create feelings of belonging and identification that ulti-
mately result in forms of collective behavior that are politically relevant – e.g. trans-
forming a more or less lose group of separate individuals in a political organization. 
While in the previous argument the power of visual communication resided in what I 
called the “reality principle” (the belief that images can give access to hidden aspect of 
reality and hidden truth) in this argument I think what we dealing with is something I 
would call the “pleasure principle”. The idea here is that digital visuality facilitates the 
circulation of images that for a variety of reasons fulfill desires of belonging, participa-
tion, identification etc. that alternative forms of communication leave somehow frustrat-
ed. Furthermore, digitalization enables and accelerates the circulation of images across 
material and immaterial obstacles to more conventional forms of communication such 
as borders, cultures, language, status, gender, etc. This argument seems convincing, on 
political grounds, because the idea of a community of (visual) meaning is compatible 
with the theorization of collective identity famously formulated by Benedict Anderson 
and, perhaps less famously, with the “puissance” of the “tribes” as described by Michel 
Maffesoli (Maffesoli, 1996). These groups are then supposed to be politically influen-
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tial, bringing to the fore issues (e.g. gay rights) which are neglected by conventional po-
litical actors (e.g. political parties based on class identity) hence contributing to increase 
the inclusiveness of  the political system. 
 
In this argument the political role of digital visuality is more indirect but possibly more 
influential. Implicit in the recognition of the emotional appeal of visual communication, 
however, is also the ambivalence of this appeal: supportive of emancipation as well as 
of oppression. If the advantage of visuality as a form of political communication - com-
pared to e.g. written communication - consists in its greater emotional appeal the prob-
lem here is to see if and to what extent the politics of emotions can foster or undermine 
emancipative potentialities – or simply democratic politics. In fact, since digital visuali-
ty can support minority rights as well as neo-Nazi and other forms of fundamentalism, 
this line of argument is convincing about the political relevance of digital visuality but 
cannot dissolve the ambivalence of its emancipative potential. 
 
From a different perspective, the political relevance of these communities of meaning 
and, therefore, of “digital” visuality can be criticized arguing that the imagined commu-
nities described by Benedict Anderson were “creatures” that could still prosper in the 
political condition of modernity. Today, in the digital age, the postmodern condition had 
profoundly altered not only the nature of politics but, more radically, the very saliency 
of meaning and the nature of the real.   
 
With Jean-Françoise Lyotard, for example, it can be argued that the condition of disen-
chantment undermines the very possibility of institutionalization of a set of common 
meanings/beliefs into a ‘grand narrative’ capable of generating organized collective ac-
tion. As Mafessoli itself notes: 
The major characteristics attributed to these emotional communities are their ephemeral 
aspect; ‘changeable composition’; ‘ill-defined nature’; local flavour; their ‘lack of or-
ganization’ and routinization (Veralltäglichung). (Maffesoli, 1996, p. 12) 
Even if digital visuality can creates community of meaning, there are legitimate reasons 
of doubts concerning the actual capacity of these communities to support emancipation. 
In fact in postmodernism there are reasons to doubt that not only digital visuality but 
meaning itself could be politically relevant, if one has to believe Frederic Jameson when 
he writes that: 
Now reference and reality disappear altogether, and even meaning – the signified – is 
problematized. We are left with that pure and random play of signifiers that we call 
postmodernism, which no longer produces monumental works of the modernist type 
but ceaselessly reshuffles the fragments of pre-existent text, the building blocks of old-
er cultural and social production, in some new and heightened bricolage: metabooks 
which cannibalize other books, metatexts which collate bits of other texts – such is the 
logic of postmodernism in general, which find one of its strongest and most original, 
authentic forms in the new art of experimental video. (Jameson, 1991, p. 96) 
In sum, the problem with this indirect political role of digital visuality can be called “in-
determinacy”: the enactment of emancipative potential is far from granted because digi-
tal visuality happens to perform community building functions in times when conven-
tional political communication and identities have lost their currency and, more radical-
ly, even the notion of meaning itself become problematic. It should be clear that this 
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situation does not, per se, rule out the possibility of emancipative usage of digital visual-
ity. It just requires, by those who want to give it a try, a more accurate assessment of the 
current state of affairs.  
2.3. Changing the social construction of reality (and of the political 
within it)  
A third argument in favor of the emancipative potential of digital visuality may suggests 
that this form of visual communication can indeed foster political emancipation by in-
troducing fundamental changes in the process of the social construction of reality - a 
process famously described by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman. The question here is 
then to see what is the nature of these changes and what are the foreseeable political im-
plications associated to them. 
 
If digital visuality cannot credibly reduce the indeterminacy of visual communication in 
its conventional functions of political propaganda and community building, one may 
still claim that, compared e.g. to conventional photography, digital visuality affects the 
social construction of reality in at least three ways. First, it opens up the practice of vis-
ual communication to large parts of the populations, blurring the distinction between 
producer, distributor and consumer of visual objects (the apparent “democratization” of 
visual communication, a process that Benjamins already discussed about film and I will 
discuss further in the next section). Second, it enhances the productive capacity of visu-
al technology beyond reality itself, into the hyper-real e.g. enabling the production of 
images that transcend the human perspective (like viewing the war with the “eyes” of a 
missile a point discussed by Jean Baudrillard on which I’ll return in a moment). Third, it 
performs as a logic for the representation of reality that have pedagogical implications 
and enhances the social value of visual communication in the social construction of re-
ality (a message must be visual if it has to be relevant at all!) independently from reality 
itself. 
 
The combined effects of these three changes introduced by digital visuality, one may 
suggest, are ‘emancipative’ on political grounds to the extent that their role is ‘subver-
sive’ of the social construction of reality. Political emancipation, in other words, is as-
sociated to the dissolution of the relations of power legitimized by notions of truth and 
reality that are effectively challenged by the logic of digital visuality, the hyperrealism 
of its representations, and the widespread access to both. To change the world, one 
should first change the way we look at it. Digital visuality can help in looking the world 
not as it is but as it could be (utopia/dystopia). 
 
This argument is presumably the most sophisticated of the three discussed here. In this 
perspective the power of visual communication goes beyond information to stretch into 
knowledge and, in particular, into the process of knowledge construction about the so-
cial world. Additionally, in this  argument The emancipative claim of digital visuality 
does not address the political directly but indirectly, blending socio-constructivism and 
media ecology in what appears a promising step towards a political theory of visual pol-
itics. The core conceptual move here is the idea that reality is constructed by social 
communication (socio-constructivism) and that if communication is relevant the ways 
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we communicate must make a difference in the way reality is constructed and, maybe, 
in the nature of it (media ecology). Finally, this argument introduces the themes of the 
crisis of truth and the substitution of reality by its representations which are two core 
aspects of Postmodernism but it also invites a critical reflection on the political short-
comings of this form of criticism and on the intellectual possibility to overcome them.  
 
My claim, in relation to the emancipative potential of digital visuality as described in 
this argument, can be summarized as follows. If digital visuality supports the dissolu-
tion of the real, the impact on the relations of power depends on the way we construe 
the conceptual linkage between reality and politics. If politics is constructed as a result 
of and dependent upon reality, then the subversion of reality is the subversion of the po-
litical: conventional processes and identities lose their meanings e.g. election, class 
struggle, etc. This “subversion” however, rather than opening up opportunities for 
emancipation, seems what Jean Baudrillard described as a regime of simulation: a situa-
tion in which relations of power are beyond the reach of change. Visual communication 
with all its ambivalence, and because of it, is a most effective tool to manage relations 
of power through –rather than despite - the subversion of the real. 
 
But if politics is seen as a process that construes reality, and the social construction of 
reality as a fundamental dimension of the competition over the control for the distribu-
tion of values in the society (as I am inclined to believe) then the subversion of the real 
is not ‘outside’ the domain of politics but an important part of it: a more or less deliber-
ate move to affect this competition.  
 
Michel Foucault already pointed out the productive capacity of power/knowledge to 
create the meanings or “discoursive formations” necessary for the reproduction of con-
trol. Where the cultural logic of late capitalism applies,  if the incessant production of 
new meanings is constitutive of relations of power, as Frederic Jameson suggests, these 
relations may not dissolve because the symbols and rituals expressing them are deprived 
of meaning (e.g. through the autonomy of the signifier). Rather, in these conditions, the 
possibility of emancipative changes is disconnected from the social construction of 
meaning: it is beyond the reach of change through communication – and this is 
(Baudrillard Jean, 2003 (2002), p. 58)“the violence of the system” that Baudrillard be-
lieved generate terrorism as a form of antagonistic violence.  
 
If digital visuality contributes to shatter the myth of truth in visual communication to 
the advantage of the “pleasure principle, political emancipation becomes illusory as the 
beauty of a computer generated landscape we may enjoy while we sit in a room without 
windows (or a digital fireplace burning on our TV screen…..). 
 
If we believe that reality is socially constructed we should also give some currency to at 
least other two ideas: first, that the control on the social construction of reality is une-
qually distributed in society and therefore, that some groups are more influential than 
others. Second, that technological evolution is also part of this reality and also influ-
enced by, rather than merely influential upon, the unequal distribution of power in soci-
ety. What this means for our discussion is that the emancipative claim of digital visuali-
ty can indeed be seen in a broader perspective, as a form of communication that affects 
the social construction of reality rather than directly the relation of power within it. But 
it also means that the social effects of digital visuality are mediated by other circum-
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stances and conditions that presumably, to a certain extent, reflect relations of power. It 
is this mediation, one may suggest, that ultimately produce the elements of ambivalence 
in the emancipative promise of digital visuality: the indeterminacy in the role of images, 
visual community and representation of the political that I have discussed here.    
 
In my view, this line of argument invites reflection on the role of ideology or, more pre-
cisely, on the role of institutionalized hierarchies of values on the social uses of availa-
ble technologies for visual communication.   
 
3. DIGITAL VISUALITY AND IDEOLOGY 
In the previous section I challenged the ideas that images or visual technology can bring 
about emancipation. In the discussion of three arguments in support of the emancipative 
claim of digital visuality I tried to argue that indeterminacy is the key feature of this 
role: a set of possibilities the implementation of which seems to rely upon, much more 
than bring about, change in established relations of power. 
 
In discussing the role of ideology I want to suggest that the emancipative potential of 
digital visuality (as other communication technologies) depends on effective usage and 
that effective usage depends on the capacity of the user to come to terms with (or 
acknowledge) the conditions affecting its usage. Most relevant, among these conditions, 
are the institutionalized hierarchies of values that more or less latently affect the uses of 
digital visuality, like other forms of expression. 
 
Therefore, I define ideology as an institutionalized hierarchy of value performing de-
scriptive and prescriptive functions in the competition over the distribution of values in 
society. 
 
Looking at this concept of ideology is important, in my opinion, to defamiliarize our 
experience of media and communication, to become aware of the risks associated to un-
reflective ways of engaging with technology in general and visual technology in particu-
lar. This is an exercise with a pedagogical connotation that I believed is necessary to 
resist the pervasiveness of the “promotional cultural” and the fact that this culture “has 
become, today, virtually co-extensive with our produced symbolic world” (Wernick, 
1991, p. 182) – a process that in political perspective goes dangerously close to the satu-
ration of the symbolic imaginary by corporate interests
1
.  
 
To address the emancipative potential of digital visuality I therefore suggest another line 
of argument – digital visuality is a (political) form of communication that participates 
(reflects, affects, etc.) to the ideological conditions of a given society.  
 
Within the limits of this paper I will briefly recall some ideas expressed in the works of 
Walter Benjamin and Jean Baudrillard that in my view are useful to identifying the 
                                               
1
 An example is the use of images in mobile communication, a form of technology that, as I argued with 
Mikko Villi is far from ‘connecting people’ but makes absence productive in the management of social 
space (Villi & Stocchetti, 2011) 
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ideological elements embedded in digital visuality. After this I will use these ideas for a 
preliminary interpretation of the visual coverage of Iraq invasion and “Arab Spring” 
along these lines. 
 
3.1. Walter Benjamin and the role of technological reproducibility   
I believe we are all familiar with the celebrated work of Walter Benjamin on the me-
chanical reproducibility of the work of art. My main point here is that mechanical re-
producibility is not a process that can be considered ideologically neutral. While I be-
lieve that Benjamin is fundamentally right concerning the cultural and socio-political 
implications of this feature, I think he is however wrong when he suggest the possibility 
of using the potential of film in support of revolutionary culture, to subvert property re-
lations and ultimately satisfy the human “reproductive” need. Past history simply sug-
gests that this has not happened and I can’t see in contemporary history any reason why 
we should expect to experience this subversive turn anytime soon. If anything, the film-
ic power of the “apparatus” seems nowadays stronger than ever, spreading from the 
large to the small screen of TV and to the even smaller screen of personal computers, in 
form of online movies, video on demand and videogames. Digital visuality may facili-
tate the diversification of delivery platforms but not the pluralism of ideological func-
tions. These functions are those that Benjamin described in his article and it may be use-
ful recall them today  
 
First, mechanical reproducibility effaces the role of tradition, destroys the aura of the 
work of art, its “cult value” but enhance its “exhibition value” hence creating the condi-
tions for the politics of art: the use of aesthetics in the competition for the control over 
the distribution of values in society. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 25)  
 
Second, in the politics of art mechanical reproducibility allows for the possibility to es-
tablish a distinctive relationship between difference and similarity in which perception 
“extracts sameness even from what is unique”. In the process of social construction of 
reality discussed earlier, mechanical reproducibility makes it possible to enforce “the 
alignment of reality with the masses and of the masses with reality … a process of im-
measurable importance for both thinking and perception”. (Benjamin, 2008, pp. 23-24).  
 
Third, the relevance of mechanical reproducibility is not primarily in the kind of (visual) 
products it creates but rather in the social functions that are attributed to these products. 
In this perspective, the training functions that Benjamin see for film applies equally 
well, in my view, to videogames and digital photography: 
The function of film is to train human beings in the apperceptions and reactions needed to deal 
with a vast apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding almost daily… The representation 
of human beings by means of an apparatus has made possible a highly productive use of the 
human being’s self-alienation. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 26 and 32) 
Fourth, even before digitalization (and the idea of “simulation” in Baudrillard!), Benja-
min describes the ideological function of film in term of “adaptation” between the peo-
ple’s perception of themselves and the world around them and the needs of the appa-
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ratus (in Baudrillard, “the system”) achieved through the blurring of the difference be-
tween reality and its representations:  
The most important social function of film is to establish equilibrium between human beings 
and the apparatus. Film achieves this goal not only in terms of man’s presentation of himself 
to the camera but also in terms of his representation of his environment by means of this appa-
ratus. (…)  This is where the camera comes into play, with all its resources for swooping and 
rising, disrupting and isolating, stretching or compressing a sequence, enlarging or reducing an 
object. It is through the camera that we first discover the optical unconscious, just as we dis-
cover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 37) (Italics in 
the original) 
Fifth, mechanical reproducibility (of which digital visuality is just the latest expression) 
is a form of control over the representation of reality. This control, however, is not ideo-
logically neutral but rather selective. While Benjamin notes that the functioning of the 
(ideological) apparatus effectively nullified the emancipative or “revolutionary” oppor-
tunities in film, I claim that the same apparatus perform in a similar way in the other 
domains where digital visuality has been put to work (namely videogames, advertise-
ment and the practices associated to private photography).  
Film capital uses the revolutionary opportunities implied by this control for counterrevolution-
ary purposes. Not only does the cult of the movie star which it fosters preserve that magic of 
the personality which has long been no more than the putrid magic of its own commodity 
character, but its counterpart, the cult of the audience, reinforces the corruption by which fas-
cism is seeking to supplant the class consciousness of the masses. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 33) 
Sixth, intrinsic in this control is the possibility of bringing about a perception of reality 
and to naturalize representations of the world that, albeit psychotic per se, are enforced 
as authoritative representation of reality: 
Many of the deformations and stereotypes, transformations and catastrophes which can 
assail the optical world in films afflict the actual world in psychoses, hallucinations, 
and dreams. Thanks to the camera, therefore, the individual perceptions of the psychot-
ic or the dreamer can be appropriated by collective perception. The ancient truth ex-
pressed by Heraclitus, that those who are awake have a world in common while each 
sleeper has a world of his own, has been invalidated by film – and less by depicting the 
dream world itself than by creating figures of collective dream, such as the globe-
encircling Mickey Mouse. (Benjamin, 2008, pp. 37-38) 
Seventh, for Benjamin, in capitalist and fascist societies film is the masses’ “true train-
ing ground” for “reception in distraction” as the form of apperception which leads to the 
aesthetization of politics and, ultimately, to war as strategies to preserve property rela-
tions.  
The logical outcome of fascism is an aestheticizing of political life (…) All efforts to 
aestheticize politics culminate in one point. That one point is war. War and only war, 
makes it possible to set a goal for mass movements on the grandest scale while preserv-
ing traditional property relations. That is how the situation presents itself in political 
terms. In technological terms it can be formulated as follows: only war makes it possi-
ble to mobilize all of today’s technological resources while maintaining property rela-
tions. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 41) (Italics in the original) 
We will see in a moment that Benjamin’s insight about aestheticization and war sound 
especially actual in relation to the visual coverage of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and in 
the “Arab Spring” in 2011.  
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What makes Benjamins analysis on the socio-political effects of technological reproduc-
ibility of the work of art a bit obsolete, in my view, is his faith on the possibility for 
communist ideology to re-appropriate the revolutionary potential of film and the idea, 
closely associated to this, that the ideological effects of film could be reversed and even 
put to good use for the emancipation of the masses. As we know, soviet Communism 
relied on film to “stimulating the involvement of the masses through illusionary dis-
plays” (Benjamin, 2008, p. 34) very much like “film capital” does, exposing the masses 
to the same aesthetization of politics that Benjamin discusses in capitalist society. If 
Benjamin would write today, he would maybe acknowledge that capitalism is an ideol-
ogy more resilient and ultimately effective than he thought – and maybe that visual 
communication is a less effective emancipative tool than he hoped.  
3.2. Jean Baudrillard and the regime of simulation 
There are at least two ideas that are relevant here: simulacra and simulation. Like Ben-
jamin, also Baudrillard believes that a crucial moment consists in the disappearance of 
difference (e.g. between the ‘map’ and the ‘territory’) (Baudrillard, Simulacra and 
Simulation, [1985] 1994, p. 2). If the emancipative potential of digital visuality is as-
sessed in relation to the social construction of reality, the mechanical reproducibility of 
images that have “no relation to any reality whatsoever” (Baudrillard, [1985] 1994, p. 6) 
should raise some concern. While in Benjamin the manipulative potential of film (and I 
argue of digital visuality too) is bent to the need of the reproduction of reality along ide-
ological lines, with Baudrillard the process get out of control. Media is not a tool to con-
trol reality but to substitute it. The substitution itself is not part of an ideological pro-
gram e.g. of the capitalist or the fascist, but a result of the representational logic of the 
media itself.  
 
Baudrillard suggests that this state of affair, the effective substitution of the real with its 
mediated representation, implies the end of the political since the possibility of change, 
in a “regime” of simulation is simply ruled out. My suggestion here is rather that this 
“regime” has itself ideological connotations and, independently from the (im)possibility 
of change, this state of affairs is indeed the result of politics: the practical effect of an 
hegemonic ideology on the social construction of the world. 
 
The value of Baudrillard’s ideas consists, in my opinion, in the insights it may offer 
when the problem is to identify the deep effects of mechanical reproducibility on the 
cultures of perception. The limit, however, consist in the incapacity to see the effects he 
describes as a state of affairs belonging to the social world and therefore, associated to 
identifiable interests and agents.  
 
To the extent that the use of images as simulacra and the “regime” of simulation associ-
ated to it are constitutive of the postmodern condition, this very “condition” is not polit-
ically neutral and assuredly far from emancipative. As Jameson put it rather unambigu-
ously:  
Yet this is the point at which I must remind the reader of the obvious: namely, that this 
whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural ex-
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pression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination 
throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history, the underside of culture 
is blood, torture, death, and terror. (Jameson, 1991, p. 5) 
I can therefore suggest that, looked at from Baudrillard ideas, the visual strategy of heg-
emonic capitalism is presumably the following: controlling the social construction of 
reality by blurring the difference between reality and simulation, by making images 
simulacra and therefore destroying the possibility of effective usage of visual communi-
cation for subversion.  
 
4. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY AND THE EMANCIPATIVE 
POTENTIAL OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION  
4.1. Iraq 1991-2003  
There is little doubt that, in the US-led invasion of Iraq, digital visuality was the weapon 
of choice in psychological warfare. The point was even made explicit by one of the 
many “analysts” involved in the war reporting exercise2. The objectives of this warfare, 
however, were not only the Iraqi people and their army but also the Western people. 
Domestic audiences were involved in that war in the role of spectators and funders, but 
also masses in the process of being trained to conform to the needs of the ruling class, if 
we follow Benjamin, and ultimately persuaded to buy into the myth of the monopoly of 
legitimate force by the US, if we follow Baudrillard, (Baudrillard, 1991, p. 96). 
 
That war, more than any other in the past, was construed as a visual “work of art” 
whose main goal was to bring the viewer to enjoy what she saw. It was a huge, costly 
and successful experiment in institutional control over the social construction of a spe-
cific reality (war). The cognitive strategy used to achieve this control consisted in blur-
ring the distinction between reality and the communicative representation of it, in prac-
tice between facts and institutional goal, opinions, etc. The role of visual communica-
tion was to provide visual evidence in support of institutional claims. Colin Powell 
presentation of the “evidence” in support of the US administration claim that Saddam 
Hussein was indeed in possession of weapons of mass destruction was not a diplomatic 
farce but rather a public rehearsal of this communicative strategy
 3
.  The visual coverage 
of the actual war was performed as a theatrical show in which live broadcast, computer 
generated simulations, and images compilations had as the main communicative func-
tion of transforming the war into a visual product for leisure consumption.  
As Mirzoeff sadly observed:  
                                               
2
 During the early hours of the US led invasion of Irak in 2003, commenting for the CNN the computer 
generated images of the invasion plans, retired US General Dan Christian quite candidly observed that 
“the coalition forces would not allow this kind of broadcasting were it not to be used for psychological 
influencing as well” (CNN 21 March 2003 at 06:16 GMT) 
3
 Available on line at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nt5RZ6ukbNc 
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    For all the deconstructive, feminist, anti-racist, visual culture theory that I have at my 
disposal, there was no way to counter the sweating, exulting triumph of the war watch-
er. To call attention to the deaths of Iraqi civilians or to mention that this attack lacked 
the authority of the United Nations would simply have added to his delight (Mirzoeff, 
2005, pp. 1-2) 
The political implications of constructing war as an object of visual pleasure (or as “war 
porn, (Baudrillard, 2066) are huge, if one only thinks about it. It is this form of enjoy-
ment, for example, that produce the emotional conditions for the transformation of a 
democratic regime in a “garrison state” – a transformation described by Harold D. 
Lasswell already in the 40s. 
 
The war coverage of the invasion of Iraq in BBC World and CNN International pro-
duced the aesthetization of war on a global scale, for a global audience, across cultures 
and irrespective of the diversities among “visual cultures”. It is trivial to say that this 
would not have been possible without digital technology. Less trivial may be to discuss 
the non-material conditions that made it possible. My suggestion, in this respect, is that 
an exercise in the aesthetization of war of that magnitude is both a sign and a tool: a 
sign (indicator) of the ideological strength of global capitalism and a tool to enforce in-
tellectual and cognitive deterrence against competing ideologies. A visual coverage of 
that sort was possible and intelligible because global audiences had already be trained – 
so to say – in that type of spectacle, e.g. by the flood of mainstream war movies and 
video games that shared the same digital technology. Furthermore, and to the extent that 
war coverage was effectively experienced and consumed by great number of people as a 
work of art for mass visual enjoyment, the aesthetization of war succeed in creating the 
cognitive basis for the legitimization of the same ideology. This is a good example, in 
my opinion, of how ideology determines the usage of available technology and how the 
ideological usage of available technology supports ideology itself.  
 
The ultimate piece of evidence for an argument against the emancipative role of digital 
technology based on the “reality principle” comes from the publication of the images of 
the abuse committee by US personnel on war prisoners at Abu-Ghraib.  
 
Once established (by the symbolic authority of transnational TV networks), the idea that 
violence can be experienced as a form of visual pleasure cannot be disposed of so easi-
ly. The ideological effects of war coverage spread to the post-war and affected the so-
cio-political impact of those images. For a public trained in enjoying the spectacle of 
large scale violence, the images of the abuses at Abu Ghraib were not construed as visu-
al evidence of the war crimes committed by the US military and political leaders but 
rather as just another piece of visual enjoyment. In that occasion, digital technology 
failed to express the emancipative potentialities because the “reality value” of those im-
ages was eroded by their “pleasure value”. It should therefore come as no surprise that 
the actual consequences of the publication of those images on the perpetrators of those 
abuses were rather mild and inspired by “scapegoating” rather than emancipative jus-
tice, while the same images are still available on the web for the visual pleasure of their 
consumers. 
 
As a note, one may also notice that still today the web is crowded of images of people 
re-enacting the abuses shown in the images of Abu Ghraib. The potential of digital 
technology, in this case, seems to go toward the naturalization of abuses and the blur-
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ring of distinctions (e.g. between our pleasure and the “pain of others”4) rather than to-
ward emancipation.
5
  
4.2. Arab Spring 2011: camera as weapons 
A commonly held belief today is that digital visuality and digital technology more 
broadly are decisive tools in the democratization of the Arab countries in the southern 
side the Mediterranean. “European Commissioner calls for ‘digital champion’ (BBC, 
European commissioner calls for 'digital champions', 2011) and “Syria: ‘Our Weapon is 
the camera’” (BBC, Syria: 'Our weapons is the camera', 2011) offer the best examples I 
could find of this belief expressed in available media. 
 
My inclination, however, is to think that digital visuality/technology only facilitates the 
use of images, enhancing the political and military value of visual propaganda. The so-
cial meaning of these images and the political effectiveness of their usage depend on the 
nature of ideology and the quality of the organization involved in the struggle respec-
tively.  
 
In the visual imagery of the Arab Spring, the interesting aspect is the similarities be-
tween these and the “revolutions” of 1989. Someone who is even vaguely familiar with 
the socio-cultural features of the populations involved, may have the impression that the 
Arab masses have been visually socialized into the basic model of French Revolution - 
as to say that when people rebel for democracy they all look the same.
6
  
 
                                               
4
 “Regarding the Pain of Others” is the title of a critical essay by Susan Sontag on this topic (Sontag, 2004 
(2003)). 
5
see, for example discussion on 
http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/blog/2007/02/kinkcom_in_san_francisco_women.html 
For cultural appropriation and subversion see: 
http://www.mccullagh.org/photo/1ds-18/abu-ghraib-prisoner-uncle-sam 
http://www.likecool.com/Abu_Ghraib_Coffee_Table--Furniture--Home.html 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/legofesto/3173782404/ 
http://www.intomobile.com/2010/08/26/verizon-droid-ad-bears-striking-resemblance-to-abu-ghraib-
torture-images/ 
http://therecshow.com/richard-simmons-may-be-gay/ 
http://www.wearemongoloid.com/ 
6
 See e.g. the cartoon by Chappatte for Makingitmagazine, available at 
http://www.makingitmagazine.net/?p=3563 
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Figure 1: “Les Temps”, by political cartoonist "Chappatte". Authorization pending 
We see women carrying guns or participating to street demonstrations and we construe 
those images as signs of gender equality and women emancipation i.e. visual evidence 
of the spread of democracy.  We see children and adults with the colors of their national 
flags painted on their faces and we understand that, as supporters of some football team 
going to an important match, these people have a strong emotional involvement in their 
“cause”. Finally we see the pictures of the villain – Gadhafi – slayed and humiliated 
and, besides the emotional “reward”, we understand that, at least in Libya, the revolu-
tion is over and democracy has won.  
 
When Benjamins observes that film performs training functions for the masses it means 
that masses adopt the visual form of expression they have been socialized to – in our 
case by films, videogame, internet, etc. When Baudrillard discusses the role of simula-
cra in the “regimes of simulation” it suggests that in these “regimes” visuality is used to 
hide rather than show reality. And while we see “them” finally becoming like “us”, we 
are “shown” the fulfillment of Francis Fukuyama’s prophecy that “the institutions em-
bodying the West’s underlying principles of freedom and equality will continue to 
spread around the world” (Fukuyama, 2002, pp. 27-28) 
 
Croatian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, however, suggests a different possibility: 
Unfortunately, the Egyptian summer of 2011 will be remembered as marking the end of 
revolution, a time when its emancipatory potential was suffocated. Its gravediggers are 
the army and the Islamists. … the Islamists will tolerate the army’s material privileges 
and in exchange will secure ideological hegemony. The losers will be the pro-Western 
liberals, too weak – in spite of the CIA funding they are getting – to ‘promote democ-
racy’, as well as the true agents of the spring events, the emerging secular left that has 
been trying to set up a network of civil society organisations, from trade unions to fem-
inists. The rapidly worsening economic situation will sooner or later bring the poor, 
who were largely absent from the spring protests, onto the streets. There is likely to be 
a new explosion, and the difficult question for Egypt’s political subjects is who will 
succeed in directing the rage of the poor? Who will translate it into a political pro-
gramme: the new secular left or the Islamists? (Žižek, 2011)7 
While the mainstream visual representation of the Arab Spring reflects ideological can-
ons of appropriateness and intelligibility, since the beginning analysts have observed 
                                               
7
 For a vehemently critical comment on Žižek’s article see Hamid Dabashi “Zizek and Gaddafi: Living in 
the old world” available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/201183113418599933.html 
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that these rebellions may support transitions not towards more democratic regimes but 
rather toward fundamentalist Islamic regimes.  
 
Is it possible that the same images have different meanings, different political strength 
and ultimately different social roles if interpreted through different hierarchies of val-
ues? My tentative answer to all these questions is ‘yes’. Circulating images of the Arab 
spring shows the progress of democracy for some and the fall of non-Islamic Arab re-
gimes for others. To “us” they show “their” effort to become like “us”. But to “them” 
the same images show “their” sacrifices made for “their” cause. And while those images 
enter “our” media culture in forms, timing and shapes crafted to suits the commercial 
needs of (“our”) media companies, the same images are metabolized in “their” visual 
culture as the narrative elements of a new rebirth for the Arab Nation. Images of death 
and sacrifice can destabilize conventional authoritarian regimes to the advantage of the 
Islamist because the death and sacrifice are construed as proofs of the value of their 
cause.  
 
The use of digital technology may work for the subversion of “conventional” authoritar-
ian regimes (which are also among the most secular ones in that region) because first, 
the ideological background of these regimes could not “digest” organized opposition 
and second, because the potentialities of this technology were exploited by political or-
ganizations equipped with enough material and immaterial (e.g. a recognizable ideolog-
ical identity) resources to make effective use of them. The same technologies cannot 
subvert the inequalities of power in our regimes, because the ideological background of 
our regimes can effectively transforms “sacrifice” into “entertainment”, the symbolic 
expression of dissidence and resistance into cultural commodity and commercial gadg-
ets – just think about the T-shirt with the face of “Che”! – to neutralize opposition by 
taking advantage of it.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper I could not address the idea that digital visuality is influential in supporting 
postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism. What I did, however, is offering 
the reader speculative evidence of another idea: that the effective emancipative use of 
material or immaterial resources (e.g. mobile phones and ideas) depends on the availa-
bility of an emancipative ideology. In this paper I have defined ideology as an institu-
tionalized hierarchy of values performing descriptive and prescriptive functions. I have 
argued that the emancipative potential of digital visuality depends on the development 
of an ideology antagonistic to that of late capitalism. Short of this, the role of digital 
visuality and other forms of communication will remain ambivalent or, more common-
ly, supportive of the hegemonic ideology.  
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